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"Fee Speech": First Amendment Limitations on
Student Fee Expenditures
INTRODUCTION
A number of college campuses are currently experiencing a stu-
dent uprising. The rebellion is less visible than the violent dem-
onstrations of the turbulent sixties, yet no less significant. It
attracts less attention because the battlefield is now a courtroom
rather than a campus lawn. Tear gas, billy clubs, and stones have
been replaced by cunning attorneys and sharp legal reasoning.
Many people are unaware of the controversy, yet it is of intense
interest to all concerned about higher education. The outcome
could have a significant effect on the functions of public colleges
and universities.
The confrontation involves a number of college students en-
rolled in state institutions' who challenge the policy of using
mandatory student fees2 to finance political or ideological activi-
ties. These students consider such expenditures analogous to com-
pelled subsidization of views they consider repugnant. Allegedly
this practice violates the dissenter's freedom of speech3 and the
corresponding right not to speak,4 as guaranteed by the first
1. In deciding if a constitutional issue is in fact present, it must be determined if
the act in question involves a state action. The two pronged test for identifying a state
action is: "[a] the entity must be endowed with governmental powers such that it
performs a state function or exercises state authority, and [b] there must be a close
nexus between the government and the challenged action such that the action 'may be
fairly treated as that of the state itself.'" Foster v. Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142, 1146 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
This Comment deals with state institutions which levy tuition and fees pursuant to
state statute and are subsidized by state budget allocations, thereby clearly within the
meaning of a state action.
2. "Fee" defined: "a charge fixed by law or by an institution (as a university)
for certain privileges or services." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 833 (1971). Student fees are levied upon students as a means of financing a
variety of services including health centers, entertainment and athletics. This article
focuses on fees appropriated for politically oriented campus activities.
3. Less frequently advanced is the argument that a particular fee usage is in
violation of a state statute. Such an argument in California, for example, would likely
call attention to the California Administrative Code section 42403 which states:
"Funds of an auxiliary organization shall be used for purposes consistent with Board
of Trustees and campus policy, and shall not be used: (1) To support or oppose any
candidate for public office, whether partisan or not, or to support or oppose any issue
before the voters of this state or any subdivision thereof ... " CAL. ADMIN. CODE
title 5, R. 42403(c) (1981).
This Comment focuses on the constitutional rather than legislative challenges.
4. This interpretation can be traced back to the works of Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison. See infra note 92 and accompanying text; Steier v. New York State
2
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amendment to the Constitution of the United States.5 The activi-
ties vary, but they have a common denominator. They all advo-
cate a political or ideological philosophy. For example, student
dissenters frequently challenge campus newspapers, guest speaker
programs and special-interest organizations. 6 They urge that
political views expressed must be funded by voluntary contribu-
tions not involuntary remittances. 7
This Comment examines the plausibility of the students' consti-
tutional challenges as measured against the constitutional rights of
universities to present controversial ideas for consideration by the
academic community.8 Included is an analysis of relevant appel-
late court decisions which have applied varying analyses while
consistently holding for the universities.9 Following this discus-
sion is a proposed analytical scheme which is more comprehensive
than any employed by the courts to date. The proposal is derived
from a recent United States Court of Appeals decision, and is of-
fered in an attempt to initiate discussion from which an analysis
capable of consistent use by the courts and litigants might emerge.
The Comment continues with an analysis of a recent California
Court of Appeal decision upholding the use of student fees to pro-
vide abortion services to students. Finally, to measure its versatil-
ity and limitations, the proposed analytical scheme is applied to
the facts of this unusual case.
Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2nd Cir. 1959); see also Gibbs & Crisp, The Question of
First Amendment Rights vs. Mandatory Student Activities Fees, 8 J. L. & EDUC. 185
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Gibbs & Crisp].
5. The first amendment to the United States Constitution states as follows:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right or the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances." U.S. CONs'r. amend. I.
The first amendment is made applicable to the states via the 14th amendment. Git-
low v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
It need be noted that this issue is independent of the broader issue regarding the
constitutionality of compelling students to pay activities fees in general, irrespective
of their ultimate use. For a discussion of this issue; see Gibbs & Crisp, supra note 4,
at 185-86.
6. Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983); Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F.
Supp. 1348 (M.D.N.C. 1974), affd mere., 526 F.2d 581 (4th Cir. 1975); Veed v.
Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149 (D. Neb. 1973), afjd mem., 478 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir,
1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
7. See, Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149 (D. Neb. 1973), affdmem., 478
F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974) (involving slightly differ-
ent facts).
8. Considered will be state and federal cases from a variety of jurisdictions, in-
cluding California. References are to California statutes which sufficiently reflect
state statutes regarding student fees.
9. Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D.N.C. 1974), afj'd meem., 526
F.2d 581 (4th Cir. 1975); Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149 (D. Neb. 1973), af/'d
mem., 478 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir.1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
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I. THE IMPOSITION OF STUDENT FEES
At the commencement of each academic term, students must
pay an activities fee 10 as a precondition to enrollment.I' The fees
are imposed in order to finance a variety of extracurricular activi-
ties, thereby providing students a diversified education.' 2 State
colleges and universities are given broad latitude by legislatures to
accomplish this objective, including the power to impose
mandatory student fees.13
In California, for example, the state legislature has enacted a
series of statutes mandating the collection of student fees for spe-
cific uses.14 These statutes supplement other laws which authorize
college and university governing boards to implement programs
and policies to further efficient use of the campus.15 The Califor-
nia Constitution limits this power only to the extent it exceeds the
law.16 Fees allocated for extracurricular activities are distributed
regardless of whether the students desire to financially support the
activities. 17
10. In California, fees are imposed upon limited and special session students as
well as those attending full time. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 89300 (Deering Supp. 1983).
Student fees vary in amount from state to state, however a typical fee is fifty dollars
per semester. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981); Veed v. Schwartzkopf,
353 F. Supp. 149, 150 (D. Neb. 1973).
11. California Education Code section 89300 provides in pertinent part:
Payment of membership fees pursuant to this section shall be a prerequisite
to enrollment in the college or university, except that if sufficent funds are
available any state college or university student may at his option and sub-
ject to the regulations of the trustees establishing standards in that regard,
agree to work off the amount of the fee ....
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 89300 (Deering Supp. 1983).
12. 14 C.J.S. Colleges & Universities § 18 (1967). See, Harman v. Alabama Col-
lege, 235 Ala. 148, 177 So. 747 (1937).
13. 14 C.J.S. Colleges & Universities § 18 (1967). The United States Supreme
Court has acknowledged the "need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the
States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards,
to proscribe and control conduct in the schools." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
14. See e.g., CAL. EDuc. CODE §§ 72246 (health services), 72248 (transporta-
tion), 76140 (out-of-state tuition), 81670 (dormatories) (Deering 1978 & Supp. 1983).
15. The California Education Code section 72233 authorizes the governing board
of any community college district to act in any manner not inconsistent with the law
or the purposes for which school districts are established. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 72233
(Deering 1978).
The California Constitution empowers the board of regents to act as it deems ap-
propriate to effectuate the administration of its trust. The board of regents is a corpo-
ration having full powers of organization and government. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9.
16. The Constitution of California states: "The Legislature may authorize the
governing boards of all school districts to initiate and carry on any programs, activi-
ties, or to otherwise act in any manner which is not in conflict with the laws and
purposes for which school districts are established." CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 14.
17. Arrington V. Taylor, 380 F.Supp. 1348, 1351-52 (M.D. N.C. 1974). At the
University of North Carolina, for example, student activites fees are collected and
disbursed in the following manner.
4
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Constitutional challenges to a university's discretionary power
require special care. 18 Courts are presented with the delicate task
of balancing two competing interests: on one hand, the traditional
desire for a collegiate atmosphere of learning, debate, dissent, and
controversy; on the other hand, the right of the individual to be
free from compelled support of a cause which is distasteful.19 One
court described the delicacy of the balance: "If we allow
mandatory financial support to be unchecked, the plaintiffs' rights
may be meaningless. On the other hand if we allow dissenters to
withhold the minimal financial contributions required we would
permit a possible minority view to destroy or cripple a valuable
learning adjunct of university life."'20
The "valuable learning adjunct of university life" alluded to by
the court concerns student exposure to an infinite range of ideas,
theories, and beliefs in an arena designed for this very purpose.2'
The university as defendant seeks to protect this valuable learning
experience from possible decay caused by a rash of dissenter
challenges.
II. THE UNIVERSITY POSITION
The philosophy embraced by universities is that he who "seeks
knowledge and truth must hear all sides of a question. '22 Argua-
bly, our educational, political, and legal systems operate on the
premise that truth emerges from the zealous advocacy of conflict-
ing ideas. Defendant universities perceive their purpose to be the
advancement of this principle, thereby justifying any incidental
impact upon the dissenter's rights due to student fee usage.23
Each student is billed for the mandatory Student Activity Fee along with his
other obligations to the University. As payments are made by students, the
collections are deposted by University employees in the North Carolina Na-
tional Bank in a Student Activity Fee account. A separate bank account is
maintained... for the proceeds of the Student Activity Fees which were
appropriated by the Campus Governing Council and its predecessor, the
Student Legislature. When employees or vendors are to be paid from thet t Activities Fee proceeds in accordance with an appropriation of the
Campus Governing Council, a requisition is signed by the fiscal representa-
tive of the organization on whose behalf payment is being made, and a
check payable to the employee or vendor is drawn by the Director of theStudent Activities Fund Office on the Student Government account
[the account] is then rembursed ....18. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 171 (1972).
19. Good v. Assoc. Students of the Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash. 2d 94, 542 P.2d 762
(1975).20. Id. at 104-OS, 542 P.2d at 768.
21. Id. at 105, 542 P.2d at 768-69.
22. MILLrNOTON, THE LAW AND THE COLLEGE STUDENT - JUSTICE IN EVOLU-
TION, 231 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MILLINGTON].
23. Brief for Appellee at 23, Galda V. Bloustein, 686 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1982).
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Some argue that great deference need be given to university offi-
cials in determining policies to effectuate this purpose. 24 The
United States Supreme Court decisions in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District25 and Healy v. James26
support the proposition that students possess the constitutional
right of free expression. The exercise of this right was recognized
by the Court as important to the free exchange of ideas.27 These
cases seemingly support the need of undisturbed university policy
aimed at ensuring exchanges of opinion on campus.
In Tinker, a group of parents and teenage school children coa-
lesced to publicize their objections to the Vietnam conflict. In
protest, these individuals wore black armbands during the 1965
Christmas holiday season.28 The principals of the Des Moines
community schools became aware of the plan and adopted a pol-
icy that any student wearing an armband to school would be
asked to remove it. Refusal would result in suspension until the
student returned without the armband. 29 Several students were
suspended under this policy. The federal district court upheld the
constitutionality of the school principals' actions, concluding that
the policy was a reasonable method to prevent disturbances of
school discipline.30 The decision was upheld on appeal.3'
The United States Supreme Court reversed, 32 holding the wear-
ing of armbands to be closely akin to "pure speech" which is enti-
tled to comprehensive protection under the first amendment. 33
Thus the school regulation prohibiting armbands violated the stu-
dents' rights of free speech.34 Presumably, this finding of free
24. Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F.Supp. 149, 153 (D.Neb.), aff'dmem., 478 F.2d
1407 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974). Sie also infra note 118 and
accompanying text.
25. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
26. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
27. Id. at 171.
28. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
29. Id.
30. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
31. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967) (per
curiam).
32. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Justice For-
tas wrote the opinion expressing the view of seven members of the Court.
33. Id. at 505, 506; Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); cf. Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
34. This freedom is not absolute. Had the principals reason to anticipate inter-
ference with the rights of other students, the action would likely have been upheld.
However, fear or apprehension of disturbance was held insufficient to overcome the
right to freedom of expression. In the words of the Court: "In order for the State in
the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opin-
ion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopu-
lar viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in
19841
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speech implies an extension of this right to college students as
well. Both groups of students have the same right to express their
views in school.35 This was the express holding of the Court in
Hea 'y v. James36
In Heal,, a number of college students organized a local chap-
ter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and filed a request
for official recognition as a campus organization.37 Despite a col-
lege committee's recommendation for approval, 38 the college pres-
ident rejected the application. The president disapproved of the
organization's publicized philosophies and protests, considering
them to be antithetical to the college's policies.39 In its landmark
decision the Court held that nonrecognition of a student organiza-
tion may not be based on mere disagreement with the philoso-
phies of the particular student group.40 The Court reiterated its
earlier finding that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional free-
doms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools. '41
The proper limitations of students' freedom of expression are
clearly enunciated in Healy. The Court considered it perfectly
the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially interfere with the require-
ments of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,' the prohibition cannot
be sustained." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749
(1966)). See, Burnside 363 F.2d at 749 wherein the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
ordered high school authorities be enjoined from enforcing a regulation forbidding
students to wear "freedom buttons."
35. W. MILLINGTON, supra note 22, at XXVIII.
36. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
37. Case law indicates that it is constitutionally permissible for colleges to re-
quire a student organization to apply for official recognition. Typical requirements
include: (a) statement of purpose of the organization, and (b) names of its officers
and assurance that the organization will abide by reasonable college regulations.
American Civil Liberties Union v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893, 896 (W.D. Va.
1970); Eisen v. Regents of the University of Cal., 269 Cal. App. 2d 696, 75 Cal. Rptr.
45 (1969). The Healy Court reiterated this principle, Healy, 408 U.S. at 188.
38. The Student Affairs Committee, composed of four students, three faculty
members and the Dean of Student Affairs, voted six to two to recommend
recognition.
39. Healy, 408 U.S. at 187.
40. Id. at 187, 188. The opinion was authored by Powell, J., who expressed the
view of eight members of the Court. Justices Douglas and Rehnquist and Chief Jus-
tice Burger wrote separate concurring opinions.
The Court quoted from the dissent written by Justice Black in Communist Party v.
Subversive Activites Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting): "I do
not believe that it can be too often repeated that freedoms of speech, press, petition
and assembly. . . must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will
be denied to the ideas we cherish." Id.
41. Id. at 180 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)). The Court
stated the frequently quoted passage: "It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate." First amendment rights must always be applied "in light of the
special characteristics of the . . . environment." Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
7
Lauren: "Fee Speech": First Amendment Limitations on Student Fee Expendit
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2016
19841 STUDENT FEE EXPENDITURES
proper for a college administration to prohibit any activity which
interrupts classes, incites eminent unlawful action, or in any way
interferes with the rights of other students to obtain an educa-
tion.42 The burden of proof, however, lies squarely on the shoul-
ders of the college to justify the rejection of an application for
recognition.43
Universities rely heavily on these and other cases which stress
the value of the exchange of ideas both in and outside the class-
room. This line of argument, however, begs the question. The
desirability of an exchange of beliefs and ideas is not at issue here.
Dissenting students have not argued that the university should not
be a "marketplace of ideas" as envisioned by the Healy Court.
44
On the contrary, these students often participate in campus activi-
ties.45 Their concern regards the practice of using their fee money
against their wishes to promote political activity. Freedom to as-
sociate 46 and advocate views is arguably different from compel-
ling individuals to support these views with their money, albeit
indirectly. Professor Tribe, in examining a similar issue involving
labor union dues, suggested "[a] better solution might well be to
require ideological activities . . . to be financed from voluntary
contributions . . . -47 The dissenting students could argue that
organizations wishing to advocate philosophies are not burdened
by requiring their activities to be funded by donations from mem-
42. Id. at 189. The Court stated: "[T]he critical line for First Amendment pur-
poses must be drawn between advocacy, which is entitled to full protection, and ac-
tion, which is not." Id. at 192.
See also Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976)
wherein the court stated: "[A]ssociations devoted to peaceful advocacy. . . or social
acceptance of sadism, euthanasia, masochism, murder, genocide . . . to list a few,
must be granted registration, upon proper application and indicated compliance with
reasonable regulations, if [the public college] continues to 'register' associations." Id.
at 167 (Markey, C.J., concurring).
43. Healy, 408 U.S. at 184. in discussing the burden of proof, the Court noted
that this precise issue had not come before it previously. It therefore analogized by
discussing guilt by association cases in which the burden is on the government in
"establishing a knowing affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims
and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal aims." Id. at 186 (footnote
omitted).
44. The Court noted: "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is
peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas' and we break no new constitutional ground in
reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom." Id. at 180,
181 (citations omitted).
45. See Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149 (D. Neb. 1973).
46. The right of people to assemble peaceably or to associate together is protected
against federal action by the first amendment and against state action by the 14th
amendment. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The freedom of "associa-
tion" is not specifically protected, but it has developed as part of the first amendment
freedoms which lie at the foundation of a free society. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937).
47. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-4 n.5 (1978).
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bers and sympathizers. Such a requirement would permit a mar-
ketplace of ideas that does not compromise the rights of those who
choose not to participate. In response, the university could point
out that a voluntary funding scheme would decrease available
funds, thereby causing a marked reduction in campus advocacy, a
detriment to all concerned.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet confronted the
problem of student activities fees.48 It has ruled, however, on the
constitutionality of labor union expenditures of mandatory dues
on political activities unrelated to its primary role as collective
bargaining agent for its membership.49 The student dissenters
have contended that the facts involved in the labor union context
are analogous to the student fee issue, thereby warranting a simi-
lar result.50
III. THE STUDENT DISSENTERS' POSITION
It is difficult to estimate the popularity of the student dissenters'
position among student populations generally. Most students sim-
ply pay their fees with little concern over the subsequent use of the
money. Nevertheless, even if only a small minority object, the
United States constitutional guarantees are invoked.51 The first
amendment would have little meaning if its guarantees were
available only to the majority or substantial minority.5 2 The true
value of the first amendment is its protection of sentiments unac-
ceptable to the majority.53
In challenging the constitutionality of certain student fee ex-
48. Consideration has been limited to the right of organizations to be recognized
for the sole purpose of access to campus meeting facilities and media communication.
On this point, the Court noted: "If an organization is to remain a viable entity in a
campus community in which new students enter on a regular basis, it must possess the
means of communicating with these students." Healy, 408 U.S. at 181.
49. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The Court held that the
first amendment prohibited unions from requiring contributions for support of an
idealogical cause to which the union member might be opposed. See infra note 82
and accompanying text.
50. Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983).
51. Dep't of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1982).
52. Id. at 461. See also Kingsley Int'l. Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of
N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959), in which Justice Stewart stated: [freedom of speech] "is
not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority."
Id. at 689.
53. "The First Amendment even protects the right to express the view that our
constitutional form of government should be overthrown by illegal means." Dep't of
Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455, 461 (Fla. 1982).
This spirit is reflected in the popular proverb attributed to Voltaire: "I disapprove
of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." TALLENTYRE,
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penditures, some dissenters contend that the United States
Supreme Court has never permitted an entity to collect compul-
sory fees for political or ideolgical purposes without the knowing
consent of the contributor.5 4 Indeed, the Constitution does pro-
hibit the government from prescribing what is orthodox in poli-
tics, religion, or other matters of opinion.55
Appellate courts have upheld a university's discretionary imple-
mentation of academic policy.56 The courts' attitude has generally
been one of judicial nonintervention.5 7 Litigation over student fee
expenditures has reflected this attitude.5 8 As a result, student liti-
gants typically seek support from case law involving analogous
factual situations outside the academic community. Most often
relied upon are labor union cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court.5 9 When examined as a series, these holdings re-
veal a tendency by the Court to protect fee payors from compelled
support of political activities that are not germain to the union's
central purpose as a collective bargaining agent for the rank and
file.60 The student dissenters hope to persuade various state and
federal appellate courts to apply these decisions by analogy and
thereby similarly protect their interests.
The United States Supreme Court first encountered the issue in
the 1961 companion cases, International Association of Machinists
v. Street61 and Lathrop v. Donohue.62 The constitutionality of the
controversial expenditures, however, remained unresolved until
1977 when the Court decided Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education .63
In Street, the union used a portion of mandatory union dues,
over employees' objections, to support candidates for the offices of
President and Vice President of the United States, as well as a
number of congressional seats.64 Those funds were also used to
propagate political and economic doctrines and to promote legis-
54. Brief for Appellant at 10, Galda v. Bloustein, 686 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1982).
The argument continues that compulsory collections are limited to the advancement
of a legitimate government interest, and the proceeds are not used for political
purposes.
55. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
56. Gibbs & Crisp, supra note 4 at 190.
57. Id.
58. Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D.N.C. 1974), affd mem., 526
F.2d 581 (4th Cir. 1975); Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149 (D. Neb. 1973), aff'd
mem., 478 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973); cert denied 414 U.S. 1135 (1974); Good v. Assoc.
Students of Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash. 2d 94, 542 P.2d 762 (1975).
59. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
60. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
61. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
62. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
63. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
64. Street, 367 U.S. at 744 n.2.
1984]
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lative programs which were opposed by the plaintiffs.65 The au-
thority to collect dues was derived from a union shop agreement 66
negotiated pursuant to the Railway Labor Act.67 Dissenting em-
ployees asserted that use of dues in this manner violated their con-
stitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech.
The United States Supreme Court invalidated the expenditures,
but not on constitutional grounds.68 It held when an employee
gives the union notice of his opposition to certain political causes,
the union may not spend the employee's dues money to support
those causes.69 The Court considered it unnecessary to determine
the constitutional question since the Railway Labor Act could rea-
sonably be construed as denying the union authority to override
the employee's objection.70 In so doing, the Court invoked the
principle that "[w]hen the validity of an act of the Congress is
drawn in question .. this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided. '71
The Court determined that using dues to support candidates for
65. Id. at 745 n.2.
66. A "union-shop agreement" is one under which affected employees are not
required to actually become members of the union, but are required to pay "service
fees" bearing a relationship to union dues to help defray the collective bargaining
costs of the agent-union which acts as the exclusive bargaining agent of all affected
employees, union members and non-members alike. See 48 AM JR. 2D Labor and
LaborRelations §§ 12-20, at 355-56, 361 (1967); Falk v. State Bar of Mich., 411 Mich,
63, 90 n.12, 305 N.W. 2d 201, 205 n.12 (1981).
67. 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Eleventh (1972).
68. The trial court concluded that the exaction and use of the dues money
violate[s] the United States Constitution which in the First, Fifth, Ninth and
Tenth Amendments thereto guarantees to individuals protection from such
unwarranted invasion of their personal and property rights, (including free-
dom of association, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of
press, freedom to work and their political freedom and rights) under the
cloak of federal authority.
Street, 367 U.S. at 745 n.3.
The Georgia Supreme Court likewise viewed the issue as a constitutional one. In-
ternational Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 215 Ga. 27, 43-44, 108 S.E.2d 796, 807
(1959).
69. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). See Validity and Con-
struction of 1951 Amendment to Railway Labor Act, Annot., 6 L. ED. 2d 1559, 1565.
The Court noted that the support of political causes "[i]s not a use which helps defray
the expenses of the negotiation or administration of collective agreements, or the ex-
penses entailed in the adjustment of grievances and disputes . .. ."
70. Street, 367 U.S. at 750. See also Merrill, Limitations Upon the Use of Com-
pulsory Union Dues, 42 J. AIR LAW & COMM. 711, 714-15 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Merrill].
71. Street, 367 U.S. at 749 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1931)).
Justice Black, in dissent, viewed the Railway Labor Act as authorizing union expendi-
tures of the kind objected to in the instant case, declaring that the statute, as so inter-
preted, violated the freedom of speech guaranteed by the first amendment: "The
First Amendment. . . deprives the Government of all power to make any person pay
out one single penny against his will to be used in any way to advocate doctrines or
[Vol. 20
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public office was beyond the union's authority as accepted by
Congress.72 The Railway Labor Act was interpreted as authoriz-
ing dues expenditures solely to defray expenses incurred while ne-
gotiating collective bargaining agreements or settling grievances
and disputes.73 The Court concluded that Congress authorized
union shop agreements with only these expenditures in mind.74
In Lathrop 75 the United States Supreme Court attempted to re-
solve the question of whether the freedom of speech of a dissenter
is violated when mandatory dues are used to advance views to
which he is opposed. The dissenter in this instance was an attor-
ney who opposed the use of state bar association dues to fund the
lobbying efforts of the Wisconsin Bar Association (WBA). The
WBA sought to promote law reform by lobbying for changes in
statutory and constitutional provisions. 76
The plaintiff protested a court order which required member-
ship in the state bar association as a condition to practicing law.77
He asserted that the requirement violated his freedom of associa-
tion while the dues expenditures violated his freedom of speech.78
The Court rejected the freedom of association claim, since the
plaintiff was not actually required to participate in bar association
activities.79 The Court reasoned that the costs of improving the
profession should be shared by the beneficiaries of the improve-
ments.80 More relevant to student fee litigations is the freedom of
speech claim which the Court failed to decide.8'
views he is against, whether economic, scientific, political, religious or any other." Id.
at 791 (1961) (footnote omitted) (Black, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 768-69.
73. Id. at 768-70. A collective bargaining agreement is an agreement between an
employer and a labor union which regulates terms and conditions of employment.
The joint and several contract of members of a union made by officers of the union as
their agents. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 239 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
74. Street, 367 U.S. at 768.
75. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
76. Id. at 822.
77. The Wisconsin Supreme Court integrated the Wisconsin Bar by an order
which created the State Bar of Wisconsin on January 1, 1957 under rules and bylaws
promulgated by the Court. The rules and bylaws require mandatory membership. In
re Integration of the Bar, 273 Wis. 281, 77 N.W.2d 602 (1956).
78. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
79. Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 843. For a discussion of the right of association as ap-
plied to labor unions, student associations and other groups; see The Supreme Court
and the First Amendment Right of Association, Annot. 33 L. ED. 2d 865.
80. Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 843.
81. Only five justices treated the issue. Of these five, three Justices Harlan,
Frankfurter, and Whittaker, upheld the constitutionality of using compulsory dues to
finance the Bar Association's legislative activites. Justice Harlan argued that holding
for the plaintiff would bring into doubt the constitutionality of government exactions
such that even federal income tax would be suspect. Two Justices, Black and Doug-
las, upheld the constitutional freedom of speech. Justices Brennan, Clark, and Stew-
art and Chief Justice Burger concluded that the issue was not ripe for decision. The
19841
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Sixteen years later the United States Supreme Court finally set-
tled the issue of union dues expenditures inAbood v. Detroit Board
of Education,82 the leading case in this area of law. In 1969, the
Detroit Board of Education and the Detroit Federation of Teach-
ers83 consummated a collective bargaining agreement. Included
within its provisions was an "agency-shop" clause.8 4 In protest,
two class actions were filed in state court by groups of teachers
against the board and union. The actions were eventually consoli-
dated by the Michigan Court of Appeals. The plaintiffs refused to
pay dues, protesting the unconstitutional use of dues for political,
ideological, and religious activites unrelated to collective bargain-
ing.8 5 The complaint prayed the agency-shop clause be declared
invalid under the Constitution on grounds it violated their first
amendment freedom of association.8 6
In its consideration of the freedom of association claim, the
Court recognized the constitutional liberties at stake when one is
compelled to financially support an opinion. Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, 7 stated:
The fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather than
prohibited from making, contributions for political purposes
works no less an infringement of their constitutional rights.
For at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an
individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free
society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his con-
science rather than coerced by the State.88
The Court went on to identify two general categories of dues ex-
penditures, those which are related to the union's role as a collec-
tive bargaining agent, and those which are unrelated to such a
role.8 9 It held that the policy of using mandatory dues to finance
record did not show what specific measures were opposed by the plaintiff, or the
extent to which the State Bar utilized dues for specific purposes to which he had
opposed. The Court eventually discarded this required showing in its decision in
Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
82. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
83. The Detroit Federation of Teachers was certified as the exclusive representa-
tive of all teachers employed by the Board of Education. The union was certified in
1967 pursuant to MIcHIGAN COMP. LAW § 423.211 (1970).
84. See supra note 66 regarding the agency shop clause.
85. Abood, 431 U.S. at 213. The nature of these activities and the objections to
them were not described in detail in the amended complaint.
86. The right of people to assemble peaceably or to associate together is protected
by the first amendment against federal action and by the 14th amendment "due pro-
cess" clause against state action. See supra note 46.
87. Justice Stewart was joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall. Jus-
tices Rehnquist and Stevens wrote separate concurring opinions. Justice Powell wrote
a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined.
88. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 235-36. The court considered it unneccessary to the disposition of the
[Vol. 20
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activities unrelated to collective bargaining was improper.90 The
Court considered the practice coercive since the union members
were not free to withhold their dues without fear of dismissal.9 '
The Constitution was interpreted as requiring these activities be
financed only by the dues of those members who consent to
such.92 Student fee dissenters rely on Abood because the Court
acknowledged the serious constitutional infringement and its pref-
erence for voluntary contributions. 93
The United States Supreme Court upheld the policy of impos-
ing mandatory dues for use to finance the union's collective bar-
gaining functions.94 The dissenters attempted to invalidate the
policy on the ground that it compelled them to associate with the
union.95 The argument was rejected for the same reason that it
failed in Lathrop v. Donohue. The Court reiterated the congres-
sional policy that labor peace is promoted by requiring employees
who obtain the benefit of union representation to share in its
cost.
96
An argument can be made that the United States Supreme
Court's rationale in Lathrop and Abood defeats a student dis-
senter's free speech claim. These cases seemingly suggest the costs
of implementing a "marketplace of ideas" should be distributed
among all students since all conceivably benefit. One significant
distinction, however, hinders this contention. Clearly, union
members directly benefit to some degree from collective bargain-
ing.97 They enjoy increased wages and improved working condi-
tions due to the union's efforts, which are financed by union
case to draw the line with precision. For a detailed discussion, see Merrill, supra note
70, at 742-58.
90. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36.
91. The agency shop agreement provided that a teacher who failed to fulfill his
dues obligation was subject to discharge. Id. at 212.
92. Id. at 234-36. The Court considered the following statements. James
Madison: "Who does not see. . . [tlhat the same authority which can force a citizen
to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establish-
ment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?"
Thomas Jefferson: "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the prop-
agation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." Id. at 234 n.31.
93. Id. at 234-35.
94. Id. at 235-36.
95. Id. at 213.
96. [These costs] entail [the] expenditure of much time and money. The
services of lawyers, expert negotiators, economists, and a research staff, as
well as general administrative personnel, may be required. Moreover, in
carrying out these duties, the union is obliged "fairly and equitably to repre-
sent all employees. . . union and non-union," within the relevant unit.
Id. at 221 (citation omitted).
97. Id. at 221-22. Int'l Assoc. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Rail-
way Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
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dues.98 The college student, however, does not stand to automati-
cally benefit from a high volume of advocacy on campus. Many
students limit their involvement to classroom instruction. The
benefits to those who choose to participate are remote and less
concrete than the benefits received by employees. Thus it appears
students do not stand in the same shoes as their labor union coun-
terparts. Therefore, this theory of cost distribution may be inap-
propriate in the university context.
The delicacy of the student dissenters' position becomes evident
at this point. On the one hand, they need to distinguish their situ-
ation from that of union members in order to avoid the applica-
tion of the cost distribution theory. On the other hand, they need
to demonstrate the strength of a labor union-university analogy as
a prerequisite to applying the favorable dicta of Abood.
Clearly, comparisons exist between these two groups. For ex-
ample, both union members and college students are required to
pay a sum as a condition for participation. For the union mem-
ber, participation is in the form of employment. 99 For the student,
it is the opportunity to matriculate as a student in good stand-
ing.OO In both situations, the tendered fee has been used to advo-
cate political views over the objection of the payors. Finally, in
both settings, the dissenter is without recourse other than discon-
tinued participation. Despite the similarities, there are numerous
distinctions between labor and higher education which cast doubt
on the appropriateness of applying labor union cases by analogy.
IV. THE UTILITY OF THE LABOR UNION-UNIVERSITY
ANALOGY
Generally, one first amendment case is distinguished from an-
other by the particular facts involved.' 0 ' An act which is pro-
tected in one context might not warrant protection in another,
even where there is consistency in the acts.' 02 A comparison of
labor unions and universities reveals distinctions that hinder the
dissenting students attempt at drawing an analogy.
The labor union and university are markedly different in sev-
98. Less direct are the benefits enjoyed by Bar Association members. The
Supreme Court in Lathrop v. Donohue denied a freedom of association claim, consid-
ering it a legitimate state policy to require the costs of improving the quality of legal
service to be incurred by "the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program,
[namely] the lawyers .. " Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 843. The Court did not elaborate
on how attorneys would benefit.
99. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note I 1 and accompanying text.
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eral significant respects. Perhaps foremost is the distinction in
purpose. The union's existence is based upon the role of bargain-
ing agent for its membership. Its primary objective is to negotiate
with management in an effort to obtain improved working condi-
tions and better wages for members. A related function is provid-
ing assistance in settling grievances and disputes. The university,
by contrast, is a cultivator of ideas and philosophies. It has, as its
primary objective, the acquisition, dissemination and interpreta-
tion of knowledge. 103 It offers to students the opportunity to pre-
pare for productive, rewarding participation in society. The
university normally does not act as an agent or representative for
students or faculty.
A second fundamental difference between labor unions and
universities is their respective structures. The labor union is an
association. 10 4 Membership is generally homogeneous. It typi-
cally consists of individuals employed in the same vocation or
profession who possess similar values and interests. 105 Solidarity
is the union's strength. To perpetuate solidarity, union member-
ship is normally a requirement for participation. 10 6 The univer-
sity is contrapositive to the labor union. The typical campus
consists of students and faculty representing a broad spectrum of
values, philosophies, and cultures. Perhaps the sole common ob-
jective is participation in the education process. Additionally, a
university, unlike a labor union, may not compel membership in
an association. 107
103. Most recently the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a student dissent-
ers argument in Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983). The court distin-
guished the central purposes of the union and university and decided "that funding
y mandatory student fees is the least restrictive means of accomplishing an impor-
tant part of the University's central purpose, the education of its students." Id. at 480.
See also Larson v. Board of Regents, 189 Neb. 688, 690, 204 N.W.2d 568, 570 (1973).
104. An association is a term of vague meaning used to indicate a collection or
organization of persons who have joined together for a certain or common object.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 111 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
105. Some unions are industrial unions, composed of workers in a particular in-
dustry; others are craft unions of specialized workers or associations of highly skilled
artists and professionals. Although varying significantly in size, power, age, character
and historical significance, each exercises a degree of sovereignty over a particular
group of workers. THE GREENWOOD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS-
LABOR UNIONS xi (G. Fink ed. 1977).
106. Where union membership is not a requirement, Congress has established a
policy that peaceful labor relations are promoted by requiring non-union members,
receiving benefits created by union efforts, to share in the costs. Thus the concept of
"agency-shop fee." See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
107. Good v. Assoc. Students of the Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash.2d 94, 542 P.2d 762
(1975). See also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 89300 (Deering Supp. 1983).
Assuming, arguendo that students were members of an association by requirement,
an argument could be advanced that the views adopted by the association to which
the dissenting member is opposed are imputed upon him in violation of his freedom
of speech. This argument was criticized in Arrington v. Taylor. The court stated:
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A further impediment to the student dissenter is the possibility
that these same labor union cases relied upon by the students can
likewise be used as authority for the universities' premise. The
United States Supreme Court in Street 08 and Abood'0 9 deter-
mined the constitutional limitations on union dues expenditures
by first defining the purpose of unions and then judging the use of
dues on the basis of its relation to this purpose. Expenditures of
dues on political activity not directly related to collective bargain-
ing were deemed unconstitutional if involuntary."l 0 The Court
logically concluded that if one can be compelled to share in the
cost of collective bargaining in order to enjoy the benefits derived
therefrom, those costs should be limited to those activities directly
responsible for producing the benefits."'
This rationale when applied to politically related student fee ex-
penditures seemingly supports the university. Student fees are col-
lected to finance extracurricular activities and facilities. 2 The
objective is to provide students an opportunity to engage in a
number of organizations and activities which are closely related to
the regular instructional program.' '3 Academicians consider this
extracurricular involvement an integral part of quality post secon-
dary education, to which students arguably possess a property
The difference in degree between, on the one hand, being required to affirm
a belief or a particular position and adopt that belief as one's own and, on
the other hand, being required to contribute dues to an association which
may ultimately adopt views as a group contrary to those held by the dues
payor, is of such a magnitude as to amount to a difference in substance.
Arrington, 380 F. Supp. 1348, 1361 (1974).
108. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
109. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
110. Id. at 235-36. The Court's ruling applies only to those political expenditures
that are unrelated to collective bargaining. The Court stopped short of drawing the
hazy line between collective bargaining activities, for which contributions may be
compelled, and ideological activites unrelated to collective bargaining, for which such
compulsion is prohibited. The Court describes the intricacies of drawing this line:
The process of establishing a written collective-bargaining agreement pre-
scribing the terms and conditions of public employment may require not
merely concord at the bargaining table, but subsequent approval by other
public authorities; related budgetary and appropriations decisions might be
seen as an integral part of the bargaining process. We have no occasion in
this case, however, to try to define such a dividing line.
Id. at 236.
111. The Court considered the underlying objective of the union shop arrange-
ment: "A union-shop arrangement has been thought to distribute fairly the cost of
these activities [collective bargaining] among those who benefit, and it counteracts the
incentive that employees might otherwise have to become 'free riders'-to refuse to
contribute to the union while obtaining benefits of union representation. . . ." Id. at
222; and concluded that activities unrelated to collective bargaining could not consti-
tutionally be funded by mandatory dues without the consent of the dues payor. See
id. at 234-36.
112. See supra notes 6, 14 and accompanying text.
113. Id.
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right.1 14 The United States Supreme Court's analysis of the union
dues expenditures seemingly suggests, by analogy, that the student
dissenter needs to demonstrate the challenged fee use to be
noneducational or in some way outside the purpose of the univer-
sity."5 It might be argued an expenditure designed to promote an
exchange of ideas lies within the purpose for which fees are
collected. 116
Under this analysis, proving a campus activity to be outside the
scope of the university purpose poses an arduous task to the dis-
senting student. It has yet to be determined whether this one step
approach most fairly resolves the question of limitations on stu-
dent fee usage. With the exception of the nonintervention policy,
courts have not developed a framework which thoroughly exam-
ines the controversy. Guidelines capable of consistent application
have yet to be devised. A new approach is needed in which the
rights of each party are clearly defined prior to applying guide-
lines to determine which rights are superior.117 The analysis
would allocate burdens of proof in a manner specific to the stu-
dent fee controversy. The practical effect of such an approach
would be to give courts and potential litigants the guidance
needed to evaluate the merits of arguments before proceeding
with an adjudication.
V. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES
The need for a new approach becomes readily apparent upon
surveying past appellate decisions regarding the controversial pol-
icy of using student fees for political advocacy. The courts have
used a variety of analyses in reaching conclusions favoring the
university. The decisions arguably contain both strengths and
weaknesses. A new approach would ideally remedy the weak-
nesses and incorporate the strengths.
In Veed v. Schwartzkopf"I8 a student brought suit against the
University of Nebraska, protesting the use of fees to pay for guest
114. Dixon v. Alabama Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Dixon v. Ala-
bama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Ala. 1960).
115. In Galda v. Bloustein, the Third Circuit Court pf Appeals reiterated this re-
quirement: "[P]ersons objecting to the fee must establish that the challenged group
functions essentially as a political action group with only an incidental educational
component." 686 F.2d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 1982).
116. Good v. Assoc. Students of Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash. 2d 94, 104-05, 542 P.2d
762, 768-69 (1975).
117. See infra notes 143-151 and accompanying text for the development of a new
approach.
118. 353 F. Supp. 149 (D. Neb. 1973); af'dmem., 478 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973);
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
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speakers"19 and to finance the collegiate newspaper.1 20 The plain-
tiff sharply disagreed with philosophies expressed by many of the
speakers,' 2' and the editorial philosophies adopted by the newspa-
per. He argued these expenditures were violative of his rights to
freedom of speech, religion and association. The district court
was not persuaded. It held the university was entitled to provide a
forum of widely divergent opinions in a structure deemed appro-
priate by the Board of Regents. 122 This discretion is "subject only
to the limitations that the determination be not arbitrary or capri-
cious... [or] imposing upon the student the acceptance or prac-
tice of . . .views repugnant to him or chilling his exercise of
constitutional rights."' 23
The court concluded no constitutional infringement occurred,
since the plaintiff remained free to associate himself with those
philosophies which conformed to his own. 24 It suggested that
only where "the university assumes the role of advocate for the
particular philosophy expressed by the speakers and the newspa-
per" would a constitutional question be raised. 25
A major weakness in Peed was the failure to recognize any in-
fringement of the plaintiffs rights. The decision strongly suggests
that in the absence of demonstrating direct control by university
officials over the fee use, no constitutional defect exists.' 26 This
conclusion is inapposite with Abood v. Detroit Board of Educa-
tion.12 7 Abood subsequently determined that compelled political
contributions do have a direct impact upon a dissenter's constitu-
tional right to refrain from contributing, which falls within the
penumbra of freedom of speech guarantees. 2 8 To be consistent
with the Abood analysis, the infringement of the plaintiff's rights
needs to be recognized before determining whether the infringe-
ment is justifiable.129 The court in Peed determined that an in-
119. "Throughout the academic year, speakers are invited to appear at the univer-
sity to speak on a wide range of topics. Funds to pay the fees and expenses of these
speakers are provided from the mandatory student fees." Peed, 353 F. Supp. at 151.
120. The Daily Nebraskan is substantially supported by student fee payments al-
though some of its operating revenue comes from the sale of advertising space.
121. For example, the speaking engagement of columist Jack Anderson, in which
he addressed the candidacy of Carl T. Curtis for U.S. Senator. Veed, 353 F. Supp. at
151.
122. Id. at 152.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. To demonstrate advocacy on the part of the university, the court sug-
gested a showing of significant control over the activity by the university administra-
tion. The plaintiff did not present evidence demonstrating such control.
126. Id.
127. 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977).
128. Id. at 235-36.
129. Id. at 222.
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fringement did not exist. Whether this conclusion would be
different if made subsequent to Abood is, of course, conjecture.
Nonetheless, in order to resolve this issue the analysis employed
should recognize the rights of all parties before determining which
rights are superior.
A second weakness in Veed is the uncertainty inherent in the
"university-as-advocate" criteria suggested by the court. Again,
the court held that in the absence of the university assuming the
role of advocate for the political view under challenge, no viola-
tion of the dissenter's right could be found. The meaning of "as-
suming the role of advocate" is unclear and might possibly be
interpreted in varying ways by the courts.
For example, the Veed court suggests that significant control
over the fee-funded activity, such as selecting the guest speakers,
or the editors of the campus newspaper, or perhaps controlling the
newspaper's content would raise serious constitutional ques-
tions.130 These obvious examples aside, the court was not clear in
drawing the line between those forms of control which constitute
advocacy on the part of the university, and those which do not. A
test which determines the extent of an individual's rights should
be free from uncertainty.
Arrington v. Taylor 131 involved facts similar to those in Veed.
Students insisted their first amendment right of free speech was
abridged by the imposition of fees that were ultimately used to
fund the campus newspaper. 132 The plaintiffs excepted to the
newspaper's advocacy of views contrary to their own. The federal
district court held against the students, concluding the subsidiza-
tion did not violate their constitutional rights. 133 It denied the
presence of an infringement upon the plaintiffs rights since no
evidence was presented which indicated the university acted as an
advocate.134
The true significance of Arrington lies in its depth of analysis.
Rather than simply dismissing the students' claim as being sub-
servient to the interest of the university, the court chose to discuss
conceivable infringements on the dissenter's rights. For example,
the court acknowledged that a dissenter could plausibly argue that
130. Veed, 353 F. Supp. at 152.
131. 380 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D.N.C. 1974), af'dmem., 526 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
132. Id. at 1360. The Daily Tar Heel is the student newspaper published at the
university. The editor and other employees are paid by the Publications Board (a
student &overnment agency) from funds derived wholly or partly from university stu-
dent activities fees.
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the challenged fee uses operate to drown out the convictions of
individuals. In other words, student fees both increase the quan-
tity of opinions conveyed on campus while simultaneously reduc-
ing the individual's economic resources that could be used to
advance the causes of his or her choice. 135 The court dismissed
this contention on two grounds. First, any reduction in one's eco-
nomic resources was incidental, therefore, insufficient to render
the fee unconstitutional. 136 Secondly, and more importantly, the
campus newspaper under attack provided a needed "forum of ex-
pression" in which the dissenter was invited to participate. 137
The court emphasized that an open forum for the exchange of
ideas is "at the core of the educational process."' 38 By focusing on
the concept of a "forum" the court succinctly identified the con-
flicting rights of free speech involved: the right to free expression
versus the right to be free from compelled expression. From that
point forward, the concept of the "open forum" would remain an
integral part of any analysis of the student fee issue.
The Arrington court concentrated its attention on the newspa-
per. The opinion did not include discussion of the concept of a
"forum" in relation to other student activities. Undoubtedly, a
typical newspaper is an open forum. In addition to printing news
items, it normally presents a cross section of opinions in the "edi-
torial" and "letter to the editor" sections. 139 However, student
special interest groups which advance specific ethics are seemingly
not forums. Therefore, criteria based upon this interpretation of a
forum would deny fee allocations to special interest groups.
The universities might suggest an alternative to this interpreta-
tion of "forum." Perhaps a forum need not be contained within
each organization or activity. Instead, the concept of "forum"
might encompass the entire campus community, with individual
organizations as merely components. According to this scheme,
the organizations as units would arguably have the right to advo-
cate their philosophies.
The Nebraska Supreme Court decision in Larson v. Board of
Regents140 suggests the contrary interpretation. Involving facts al-
135. Id. at 1361. A similar argument in the labor union context was recognized by
the Ninth Circuit in Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1004 (9th Cir.
1970).
136. Arrington, 380 F.Supp. at 1362.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1363. The court explained that the newspaper exposes "the student
body to various points of view on significant issues, and (allows) students to express
themselves on those issues." Id. at 1362. See also, Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475
(4th Cir. 1983).
139. Arrington, 380 F. Supp. at 1362.
140. 189 Neb. 688, 204 N.W.2d 568 (1973).
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most identical to Veed and Arrington, the court rejected student
challenges to the policy of allocating mandatory fees to the stu-
dent newspaper and the visiting speakers program. The court,
however, warned that if an entire activity has been directed to-
ward a particular point of view, then a violation of constitutional
rights might exist. 141 Larson applied this test to the specific activi-
ties under attack rather than to student activities as a whole. This
implies that each fee funded program standing alone need provide
an open forum. Such an interpretation favors dissenters who take
aim at a specific fee funded activity or a special interest organiza-
tion that does not itself provide an open forum for opposing
views.
Unfortunately, Veed, Arrington, and Larson raised the constitu-
tional issue without resolving it satisfactorily. The ideal analytical
approach must consider these unanswered questions. It would
contain guidelines whereby only those situations which truly vio-
late a dissenter's rights would be identified. To ensure this, it
would assign burdens of proof in a manner certain to recognize
the rights of each party. Most importantly, the analysis would fo-
cus on the allocation of fees, and the extent to which an "open
forum" for expression is reflected in that allocation. In 1982, the
Third Ciruit Court of Appeals contributed significantly to the de-
velopment of a workable framework in Galda v. Bloustein.142
VI. GALDA V BLOUSTEIN: A WORKABLE ANALYSIS EMERGES
The complexity of the student fee issue requires constructive
analytical reasoning. GaIda v. Bloustein stands in the forefront
due to the fresh, systematic approach employed by the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. The court treated a number of component
issues which, when considered together, suggest a viable analytical
scheme. Because the scheme may conceivably favor a dissenter's
freedom of speech in certain situations, Gaida represents a depar-
ture from the policy of judicial nonintervention in the area of aca-
demic affairs.
The Galda court did not couch its analysis in terms of reform.
The end result, however, was the emergence of an approach that
has since been acknowledged with favor. 143
Although the facts in Gaida are unique, the analysis is adapta-
141. Id. at 690-91, 204 N.W.2d at 571. The court commented in regards to the
speaker program that "If such views are expressed only as a part of the exchange of
ideas and there is no limitation or control imposed so that only one point of view is
expressed through the program, there is no violation of the constitutional rights of the
plaintiffs." Id.
142. 686 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1982).
143. Kania v. Fordham 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983).
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ble to facts typically involved in earlier cases. In Galda, student
newspapers and guest speaker programs were not the activities in
controversy. Nor was the collection and allocation of the general
student fees being challenged. What was challenged by several
Rutgers University' 44 students was the collection of a mandatory
fee 45 for the express purpose of financing the activities of the po-
litically active student run New Jersey Public Interest Research
Group (NJPIRG).146 The NJPIRG fee was listed separately from
other charges on the student term bill.
The plaintiffs contended that NJPIRG should not be entitled to
student fee funding because it is a political organization. 147 In
fact, all the parties to the litigation agreed that NJPIRG, in addi-
tion to its educational function, 148 also functions as a political,
ideological student group.149 This being established, the students
144. Rutgers University is the State University of New Jersey. Plaintiffs brought
suit individually and upon behalf of all others similarly situated. Joined as defend-
ants were Dr. Edward J. Bloustein, President of Rutgers University; Dr. T. Edward
Hollander, Chancellor of Higher Education of the State of New Jersey; Walter K.
Gordon, Dean of Rutgers Camden College of Arts and Sciences; and members of the
Board of Governors.
145. Until 1978, the New Jersey Public Interest Research Group (NJPIRG) fee
was $1.50 each semester. It was subsequently raised to $2.50 which amounted to ap-
proximately $100,000 annually for NJPIRG. 686 F.2d at 162 & n.6 (1982).
The authority of the University to impose such fees is derived from the New Jersey
Statute which provides: "The board of governors shall have general supervision over
and be vested with the conduct of the university. It shall have the authority and
responsibility to: . . . (c) Disburse all moneys appropriated to the university by the
Legislature, moneys received from tuition, fees, auxiliary services and other sources
. . N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:65-25 (West Supp. 1983).
146. NJPIRG is a
non profit, politically unaligned corporation directed by students, employing
non-student professionals such as lawyers and scientists on a full-time basis,
and devoting its efforts to "constructive social change" by studying and
working for change in such areas as consumer protection, evironmental pro-
tection, occupational health and safety, and housing to name a few. [Among
the states in which PIRG operates include] Arizona, California, Connecti-
cut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Oregon, Texas and Vermont.
Fishbein, Legal Aspects of Student Activities Fees, J.C. & U.L. 190, 192 (1973-74)
[hereinafter cited as Fishbein].
147. NJPIRG is not eligible for student activity funds because of its independent
status. However, in March, 1972, Rutgers adopted a policy for funding student spon-
sored programs and organizations such as NJPIRG that would otherwise not qualify
for university financial support. The policy was adopted after intense lobbying efforts
by NJPIRG. See Galda, 686 F.2d at 161-62 for a discussion of the requirements for
special funding.
148. The educational function is described as involving students in real life learn-
ing experiences by exploring the possibilities and difficulties of legal social change.
Id. at 161.
149. Specifically, it is alleged that NJPIRG is an organization founded for the
primary purpose of advocating specific ideological and political positions before the
United States Congress and the legislature of New Jersey. Indicative of this is the
NJPIRG brochure which includes in its list of accomplishments, the following:
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alleged the disbursement of fees to and for NJPIRG required
them to financially support views which they did not advocate,
thereby violating their first and fourteenth amendment rights.' 50
In response, the university justified the expenditures by stressing
NJPIRG's "legislatively recognized educational contribution to
the university and its students." 151
The case was ultimately remanded to provide the district court
an opportunity to apply the standards developed by the court of
appeals. These standards represent the important contribution to-
ward the development of a reliable analytical scheme. They shall
next be discussed before testing the overall scheme on a recent fact
situation.
A. Establishing,4 Prima Facie Case
Fortunately, the Galda court chose to expressly assign the bur-
dens of proof. 152 Past decisions do not include this discussion and
as a result potential litigants have not been given the guidance
needed to assess the strength of their cases.
The court first noted with approval that the university has
broad latitude in providing students with an opportunity to par-
ticipate in, or oppose, the expression of a broad spectrum of ideol-
ogy. 153 Rather than holding for the university on the basis of this
-testifying before the Board of Public Utilities to oppose Jersey Central
Power and Light's request to charge consumers for $113 million in costs
resulting from the Three Mile Island accident.
-lobbying extensively for the Federal Middle Income Student Assistance
Act. Galda, 686 F.2d at 161 n.5.
150. The students interpret the first amendment violation as follows: "The first
amendment exists to protect the political right of the minority to be free from the
dictates and the potential tyranny of the majority. The sole freedoms at risk are those
of the 'minority' to be free from compelled support of NJPIRG and free from the
burdens of repetative 'affirmative obligation' and self-identification." Brief for Ap-
pellant at 25, Galda v. Bloustein, 686 F.2d 159 (1982).
The student plaintiffs continued:
such a [funding] scheme is unconstitutional because it compels students to
support the political view of others. Infringement of this basic personal free-
dom is not justified, nor could it be, by any compelling government interest.
Rather, the funding policy gives one political philosophy an unjustified ad-
vantage; the imprimatur of governmental approval ....
Brief for Appellant at 9, Galda v. Bloustein, 686 F.2d 159 (1982).
151. Galda, 686 F.2d at 164. Another argument advanced by Rutgers, and
adopted by the district court was that the fee is not a condition of matriculation be-
cause no sanctions are imposed upon those that withhold their fee. The student re-
sponse was that Rutgers represents the fee as one that is required for enrollment.
Students, respecting the authority of Rutgers, pay the fee. Brief for Appellant at 12
n.1, Galda v. Bloustein, 686 F.2d 159 (1982).
152. Galda, 686 F.2d at 166.
153. The court cited Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 268-69 n.5 (1981); Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149 (D. Neb.
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policy alone, however, the court continued to outline the method
by which the parties' claims should be evaluated.
The initial burden is upon the* student dissenter to overcome the
presumptive validity of the university's judgment that an organi-
zation contributes to the academic community and is thus deserv-
ing of fee funding.154 The court indicated that to accomplish this,
"[the] persons objecting to the fee must establish that the chal-
lenged group functions essentially as a political action group with
only an incidental educational component."' 55 The university
would then be afforded an opportunity to counter this showing.
Should the university fail, the student will have stated a claim for
relief under the first and fourteenth amendments. The university,
however, is given an opportunity to demonstrate an overriding
state interest which would justify the infringement on the rights of
the students.' 56 The state interest most typically asserted is the
need for creating a diversified educational environment.' 57 If the
university's contention cannot be sustained, the controversial ex-
penditure is deemed unconstitutional. 158
This method of allocating burdens of proof is by no means
unique. 59 No court, however, faced with the student fee issue has
elected to expressly apply it. This evidences the past unwilling-
ness by most courts to recognize even the possibility of an in-
fringement on the dissenters' free speech rights.
1973); Good v. Assoc. Students of Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash.2d 94, 105, 542 P.2d 762,
769 (1975) in support of this proposition.
154. Ga/da, 686 F.2d at 166.
155. Id.
156. The Court noted: "We do not rule out the possibility that, even in the face of
an unrebutted prima facie showing, the university might demonstrate a compelling
state interest by establishing the importance of the challenged group's contribution to
the university forum." Id. at 166-67.
157. Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983).
158. Ga/da, 686 F.2d at 166.
159. After a long evolution, it is today well established that the United States
Supreme Court will apply a strict form of review to any governmental action which
limits the exercise of one's fundamental constitutional rights. Included within these
rights are the first amendment guarantees. For a discussion of other rights considered
fundamental, see NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 419, 458-61 (2d ed. 1983).
When it is shown that an infringement of a fundamental right has occurred, the
state is required to demonstrate a "compelling" interest whose value is so great that itjustifies the limitation of fundamental constitutional values. Id. at 524. The Supreme
Court has determined that the state interest in question must be one of "vital impor-
tance" in order to justify the infringement. A state interest is not of vital importance
if there exists a less drastic means of achieving the same basic purpose. Elrod v.
Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362-63 (1976); In Shelton v. Tucker all teachers in Arkansas were
required by statute to provide a list of all organizations and causes to which they
contributed over the last five years. The court struck down the disclosure statute
because "[it went] far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State's
legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competency of its teachers." 364 U.S. 479, 490
(1960).
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B. Examining the Concepts of "Educational Component" and
"Compelling State Interest"
The Gaida court did not assess precisely how much of an "edu-
cational component" would be necessary to uphold the presump-
tion favoring the university. However, the court did make a
significant point while discussing NJPIRG's political nature. To
be sufficiently educational, the activity need be one that is directly
connected to the university structure, thus analogous to a class-
room function.1 60 To illustrate its point, the court noted that if
students work for a political action group which is independent
from the school, it could not be contended that such a group is
entitled to student fees merely because student participants gain
education through participation.1 6 1 The court, unfortunately,
went no further than this simple illustration in suggesting what is
meant by "educational."
In an attempt to identify the threshold for the status of "educa-
tional," the Attorney General of Maryland has stated that the ac-
tivity in question must be "necessary and convenient" to promote
the "well-being" of the academic community. 162 Using this stan-
dard, the Attorney General concluded that state institutions could
not impose a mandatory PIRG fee.163 His opinion, however, does
not elucidate the issue because reasonable minds may differ con-
cerning what is "necessary and convenient" or which activities
contribute to the "well-being" of the community. Ultimately, it is
the university governing board that makes this determination.
Thus, the argument is circular: a university may not impose fees
for use by groups which do not contribute to the community's
well-being, yet the university has the discretion to determine what
constitutes such a contribution. It appears that the term "educa-
tional component" remains an ambiguity that is left for future
courts to interpret.
Assuming that a student dissenter is successful in establishing a
prima facie case, the university will normally attempt to demon-
strate an overriding, or compelling interest which would justify
the student fee allocation. 64 Again, this generally takes the form
of the society's interest in providing a learning environment abun-
dant in ideas, philosophies, and opinions. Universities maintain
that student fee contributions to campus newspapers, speaker pro-
160. Galda, 686 F.2d at 166.
161. Id.
162. See Fishbein, supra note 146, at 193 for a discussion of the Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion of August 14, 1973.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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grams, debate panels, and other academically oriented extracur-
ricular activities provide forums for a diverse range of opinion. 6 5
The Galda court acknowledged the validity of the concept of a
"forum" as an overriding interest. Although questioning the anal-
ysis employed, 66 the Galda court agreed with the conclusion in
Veed v. Schwartzkop 67 and Arringlon v. Taylor 168 that student
newspapers and guest speaker programs contributed to a forum
for divergent opinion on a number of topics. With the exception
of Larson v. Board of Regents,169 no court had considered whether
each student fee funded activity needed to constitute a forum, or
whether the collectivity of such activities was sufficient to create a
forum.
In Larson, the Nebraska Supreme Court implied that each ac-
tivity needed to be a forum in itself.170 The Galda court settled
this particular question by examining the nature of the collected
student fee. The court concluded that where a standard, lump
sum student fee is imposed and subsequently distributed to a vari-
ety of groups, the fee can be perceived as providing a general fo-
rum.'7' In contrast, a fee segregated from the lump sum fee on the
term bill and designated for use by one organization would trigger
an independent forum requirement within the recipient activity or
organization.
This distinction is critical. It suggests that use of the lump sum
fee would insulate universities from constitutional scrutiny, pro-
vided the fees are allocated in a nondiscriminatory manner. 72
This is acceptable since student governments at many schools are
being given primary responsibility for determining the course of
extra curricular activites through appropriations of the lump sum
fees. 173 Segregated fees do not have this safeguard and therefore
165. Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983); Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F.
Supp. 1348 (M.D.N.C. 1974), afd mem., 526 F.2d 581 (4th Cir. 1975); Veed v.
Schwartzkopf, 353 F.Supp. 149 (D. Neb. 1973); af/Idmem., 478 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir.
1973); cert. denied 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
166. The court noted that Veed and Arrington antedate 4bood.
167. 353 F. Supp. 149 (D. Neb. 1973).
168. 380 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
169. 189 Neb. 688, 204 N.W.2d 568 (1973). See supra notes 140-41 and accompa-
nying text.
170. Id.
171. Galda, 686 F.2d at 166.
172. Id. See also, Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972), wherein the Supreme
Court held that non-recognition of a student organization could not be predicated
soley upon the administration's disfavor of the aims and goals of the organizations
national chapter.
173. See generally Smith, Student Rights ofPassage: A Full or Limited Partnership
in University Governance?, 9 J.L. & EDUC. 65, 74-75 (1980); Student Participation in
Colleges and University Government, in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 47
(1971); Comment, Challenging Educational Fee Increases, Program Termination and
[ ol. 20
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warrant closer scrutiny. Special interest groups are often unrecep-
tive to opposing viewpoints. NJPIRG's student workers, for ex-
ample, "are foreclosed from supporting contrary positions unless
such support is 'okayed by the state board.' ",174 Thus, the use of a
segregated mandatory student fee to finance special interest
groups seemingly constitutes an infringement on the first and
fourteenth amendment rights of those students who oppose such
views. If such groups were financed by the lump sum fee, student
dissenters would have recourse to appeal to their student govern-
ment representatives for the financing of opposing views.
The apparently simple solution of switching to lump sum fee
financing is not available to some student organizations, which
are independent and ineligible for student fees absent a special
funding policy enactment by the university. 175 In such cases, fi-
nancing must be through purely voluntary contributions.
In most cases, student activities and organizations are financed
by the lump sum fee. Thus, under the Galda analysis the universi-
ties will usually succeed in their efforts to demonstrate a compel-
ling interest which overrides that of the student dissenter.
Situations such as the one involving PIRG, however, need to be
recognized and treated in the manner suggested by the Galda
court, thereby minimizing the risk of overlooking a possibly un-
constitutional fee expenditure.
C. Examining the Refund as a Possible Remedy
In addition to the compelling state interest argument, Rutgers
University contended that the NJPIRG fee was constitutional be-
cause the group afforded students an opportunity to obtain a re-
fund.' 76 Thus, the Galda court was faced with the issue of
whether a student fee refund mechanism could remedy a poten-
tially unconstitutional fee allocation. Since no court faced with
Deterioration, and Misrepresentation o/Program Quality: The Legal Rights and Reme-
dies of Students, 19 CAL. W.L. REv. 467 (1983).
174. Galda, 686 F.2d at 166. The deposition of plaintiff Joseph P. Galda is
enlightening:
Q: Have you ever submitted a project proposal to your local board or to
the State board or to any staff members of PIRG?
A: I asked at the State headquarters one of the staff people if they would
take a project by a pro-life group, and they said given the organization's
feelings about abortion, they would not.
Id. at 166 n.12.
175. In March 1972 Rutgers adopted a policy for funding student sponsored pro-
grams and organizations such as PIRG, that otherwise would not qualify for univer-
sity financial support. Gaida, 686 F.2d at 161.
176. The term bill was accompanied by a flyer describing PIRG; the back of the
flyer contained a "refund request" form, which could be completed by the student
and submitted to PIRG. GaIda, 686 F.2d at 162.
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the student fee problem had examined this issue, the Galda court
surveyed other relevant case law. It found that courts and com-
mentators agree that "a funding system requiring continual pay-
ments and subsequent refunds to dissenters may not satisfy the
requirements of the first amendment." 177
This position was first stated by Justice Stevens when consider-
ing a refund mechanism adopted by a labor union. In his concur-
ring opinion in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 78 Justice
Stevens remarked: "[T]he Union should not be permitted to exact
a service fee from nonmembers without first establishing a proce-
dure which will avoid the risk that their funds will be used, even
temporarily, to finance ideological activities unrelated to collec-
tive bargaining."'' 79 However, this was not the holding of the ma-
jority opinion.' 80
More recently, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals identified a
funding system that survived a first amendment challenge. In
Kepac v. Kentucky Registry ofElection Finance,'8' em.ployee mem-
bers of the Kentucky Education Association challenged the consti-
tutionality of a funding system which subsidized a political action
committee (KEPAC).182 The "reverse check-off' system operated
by automatically deducting from employee-member paychecks a
contribution to KEPAC unless employees affirmatively "checked-
off' that they declined to participate. 183 If an individual failed to
check-off, but subsequently decided not to participate, the mem-
ber could stop the deduction and could also obtain a refund for
past contributions. 8 4 The court approved the "reverse check-off'
system since dissenters were afforded the opportunity to refrain
from contributing at the outset. l85
177. Id. at 168.
178. 431 U.S. 209 (1977); See supra note 82 and accompanying text for a further
discussion.
179. 431 U.S. at 244 (Stevens, ., concurring).
180. The Abood court explicitly refrained from addressing the question whether a
refund mechanism is sufficient to render constitutional a fee collection and expendi-
ture. 431 U.S. at 242 n.45. However, the court enunciated the objective regarding
remedies: "[t]o devise a way of preventing compulsory subsidization of ideological
activity by employees who object thereto without restricting the Union's ability to
require every employee to contribute to the cost of collective-bargaining activities."
Id. at 237 (footnote omitted).
181. 677 F.2d 1125 (6th cir. 1982).
182. Kentucky Educator's Public Affairs Council.
183. By contrast, a regular "check-off" system requires one to affirmatively indi-
cate his desire to contribute. For example, the optional one dollar contribution to the
election fund as it appears on federal income tax forms. The "reverse check-off"
requires one to indicate a desire not to contribute, therefore, inaction results in auto-
matic contribution.
184. Kepac, 677 F.2d at 1128.
185. Id. at 1134. The court relied in part on Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Educ. Ass'n, 457 F. Supp. 1102 (D. D.C. 1978) wherein the court invalidated a contri-
[Vol. 20
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In Ga/da, the refund mechanism employed by NJPIRG did not
permit students to withhold the NJPIRG fee at the outset.'8 6 Fur-
thermore, students requesting a refund normally had to wait "sev-
eral months" before receiving it.187 On the strength of the
KEPAC decision, the court held that the NJPIRG refund mecha-
nism was insufficient to remedy a constitutional defect, should
one be found by the lower court on remand.
By so doing, the court implied that had the NJPIRG funding
scheme contained a "reverse check-off' option, then it possibly
may have cured a constitutional defect. This implication, how-
ever, is not immune from a plausable constitutional challenge.
Arguably, even the use of a reverse check-off system on a univer-
sity campus would violate the first amendment rights of unwilling
contributors. For example, in Federal Election Commission v. Na-
tional Education Association 18 8 it was noted that in the year fol-
lowing the implementation of an automatic deduction method of
contributions, the number of contributors nearly doubled. This
suggests that many contributions were involuntary, a suggestion
supported by the number of refund requests which followed. 189
Within the university setting, the commencement of an aca-
demic term is usually accompanied by a confusing variety of ad-
ministrative paperwork required of students. As a possible result,
uninformed or otherwise involuntary contributions to PIRG could
occur whether or not a "reverse check-off' system is provided.
Of course, before this issue can become ripe for decision the
more central issue concerning the constitutionality of the fee allo-
cation itself needs to be resolved. The standards set forth in Ga/da
v. Bloustein appear suited to this task.
It appears that the new approach, as first enunciated in Ga/da,
is applicable to the typical fact situations that have arisen in the
past, namely challenging the use of fees for the advocacy of polit-
ical or ideological ideas. But what of atypical situations-is the
Ga/da analysis adaptable to challenges based upon constitutional
grounds other than free speech? An application of the analysis to
such an atypical set of circumstances indicates that its value is sig-
nificantly reduced. To illustrate this, a recent California state
bution plan because the union member was not asked before hand if he wanted a
contribution to be deducted along with his dues.
186. Galda, 686 F.2d at 162.
187. Id.
188. 457 F. Supp. 1102 (D. D.C. 1978).
189. Id. at 1108. It need be noted that under this particular deduction method,
members were powerless to prevent the deductions at the outset, thereby accounting,
in part, for the huge increase in contributions. The court did not specify the number
of refunds that were given.
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court decision will next be examined in light of the Galda v. Blous-
tein decision.
VII. THE LIMITATIONS OF G.4LDA4
In Erzinger v. Regents of the University of California,190 students
at the University of California, San Diego refused to pay the por-
tion of the university's registration fee used for abortion counsel-
ing, referral, and abortions.' 91 As a result, the university
cancelled the students' enrollment for reasons of nonpayment. 92
The students brought suit on first amendment grounds, alleging
that the practice of subsidizing abortion services with mandatory
student fee revenue interfered with their free exercise of religion.
They argued that the policy compelled them to violate their reli-
gious beliefs against abortion as a condition for attending the
university. 193
These rather unique facts are clearly distinguishable from those
typically litigated. For example, the challenged fee in Erzinger
was a registration fee, not an activities fee. 194 The funds derived
were not used to advocate abortion. Instead, the university's ob-
jective was to provide comprehensive health services in an attempt
to minimize the detrimental effects of students' health conditions
on their academic performance.195 This objective is markedly dif-
ferent from the more common university objective of providing a
campus "marketplace of ideas" through the vehicle of student
fees. Simply stated, subsidizing health services, including abor-
tions, is different from funding extracurricular academic activities,
the focus of which is on the advocacy of ideas.
The analytical scheme conceived by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Galda is most effectively applied to the issue of using
mandatory fees to finance the advocacy of ideas. Although the
mere availability of abortion services on campus can arguably be
considered "advocacy," this is not the form of direct advocacy ad-
dressed by the GaIda court. Thus, the discussions of the "forum"
requirement, the type of fee in issue, lump sum as opposed to seg-
regated, and the concept of the refund as a possible remedy are
not dispositive to the situation in Erzinger.
The Erzinger case was resolved in favor of the university on the
grounds that the students failed to allege and prove the university
190. 137 Cal. App. 3d 389, 185 Cal. Rptr. 791 (Ct. App. 1982).
191. Id. at 391, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. The court did not address the distinction between fees.
195. Id. at 392, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
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coerced their religious beliefs or unreasonably interfered with
their practice of religion. 196 The students had asserted that their
religious beliefs required them not to pay those portions of student
fees the university used to provide abortion related services. The
court dismissed this by analogizing the issue to the refusal to pay
taxes for religious reasons:
[N]othing in the Constitution prohibits the Congress from levy-
ing a tax upon all persons, regardless of religion. . . . The fact
that some persons may object, on religious grounds, to some of
the things that the government does is not a basis upon which
they can claim a constitutional right not to pay a part of the
tax. 197
The courts reliance on this analogy is boldly presented despite
the United States Supreme Court decision in Flast v. Cohen 198
wherein the court held the federal government's spending powers
are limited by the "establishment clause" of the first amend-
ment. 199 In that case a federal taxpayer was granted standing to
challenge the use of tax revenue to finance the purchase of reli-
gious textbooks. The establishment clause, however, was not in-
volved in Erzinger, thus the court's analogy to taxpayers is
apparently not affected by the Fiast v. Cohen decision. The stu-
dents alleged an interference with theirfree exercise of religion,
rather than the university's establishment of religion. The "free
exercise clause" of the first amendment has not been identified by
the United States Supreme Court as a second limitation on con-
gressional spending power.2 °
The court, in deciding against the students' claim, did not refer
to Gaida v. Bloustein or any of the other student fee cases or labor
union decisions. This is itself indicative of the distinction between
issues, and the inapplicability of the GaIda approach to student
fee cases not involving extracurricular advocacy of ideas, con-
cepts, and convictions.
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, judicial interpretation of first amendment protec-
196. Id. at 393, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94.
197. Id. at 393, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 794 (quoting Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586,
588 (1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1036 (1970).
198. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
199. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend I.
200. Flast v. Cohen focused on the limitation created by the establishment clause.
The Court offered no examples of what other types of constitutional provisions would
grant standing, and neither have later cases. For a discussion, see NOWAK, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 80 (2d ed. 1983).
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tions has slowly evolved. Determining whether the right of free
speech protects public college students who resist the policy of us-
ing mandatory student fees for political advocacy has also gradu-
ally evolved. The majority of appellate courts have not
interpreted the first amendment as affording this protection. The
courts have deferred to the expertise and discretionary powers of
university administrators for implementing policies that most ben-
efit the academic community.
In defending against claims, universities have stressed the im-
portance of judicial nonintervention. The United States Supreme
Court, however, has demonstrated a willingness to intervene to
uphold the first amendment rights of students. Healy v. James20 1
protected students' rights to assemble and speak freely by denying
a university's attempt to control the expression of views on cam-
pus. Universities now cite Healy to their advantage. They argue
that fee-funded student organizations have an undeniable right to
speak out on any issue, political or otherwise.
Student dissenters, in order to fortify their claims, have recently
applied by analogy a series of United States Supreme Court cases
involving labor unions. InAbood v. Detroit Board of Education,202
the Court emphatically acknowledged a freedom from compelled
political contributions which falls within the penumbra of free
speech protection. Despite the defects in the union-university
analogy, this fimding suggests the impropriety of the traditional
laissez-faire policy adopted by past courts. These decisions have
employed various approaches but have consistently held for the
universities.
This Comment develops an approach that can be consistently
applied to determine when a university's fee policy might be
subordinated to the rights of the student fee dissenter. The ele-
ments of this approach were identified in GaIda v. Bloustein, but
were not organized into a structured framework. The analysis fo-
cuses on the proper allocation of burdens of proof to ensure the
rights of both parties will be recognized and zealously advocated
in a standard fashion. The ultimate determination of the issue is
accomplished by applying these guidelines. If the fee is distrib-
uted to provide a diverse forum of views, with access available to
dissenters, the expenditures would be constitutional regardless of
the political cause to be subsidized. If no such forum exists, dis-
senters must be afforded an opportunity to withhold contribu-
201. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
202. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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tions. Hopefully, this approach will assist future litigants in case
preparation and future courts in resolving the questions presented.
Jason F Lauren
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